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Hepatitis B virus (HBV) is an important threat to global 
public health. Despite the availability of safe and eﬀec-
tive prophylactic vaccines, the existence of a large reser-
voir of chronic carrier patients impedes the eradication 
of this virus; therefore, HBV-related diseases still rank 
ninth on the global ranking of causes of mortality (1). 
Moreover, HBV is considered the ﬁfth most important 
infectious agent leading to death, with approximately 
1 million HBV-related deaths occurring per year (2). Pre-
vious studies showed that the infectivity rate of HBV is 
higher than those of other blood-borne viruses. The risk 
of infection after percutaneous exposure to the 3 major 
blood-borne viruses—HBV, hepatitis C virus (HCV), and 
human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV)—varies greatly, 
and the risk of infection in non-immune individuals ex-
posed to HBV may be over 30% if the source is hepatitis 
B e antigen (HBeAg) positive. The average infection rate 
for HCV and HIV is 1.8% and 0.3%, respectively (3). The 
residual risk of post-transfusion infection with HBV is 
higher than that with HIV and HCV (4). Furthermore, the 
ﬁndings of recent studies indicate that HBV is more vi-
able in needle syringes at room temperature than other 
blood-borne viruses (5). The transmission pattern of HBV 
in diﬀerent geographical regions depends on the local 
prevalence of chronic HBV carriers. For instance, in high 
prevalence (prevalence rate > 8%) regions such as South 
Asia, mother-to-child (vertical) transmission is the main 
route of transmission; in European countries with a low 
prevalence (prevalence rate < 2%), sexual transmission 
and unsafe injection practices are the main modes of 
HBV transmission. Nosocomial transmission and un-
safe injection practices are responsible for more than 
60% of HBV infections in Central Europe (6). The main 
mode of HBV transmission in East Asia, a highly endemic 
region, is vertical. In West Asia and the Middle East, the 
route of transmission and HBV seroprevalence are vari-
able depending upon the region. For instance, Iran has 
low HBV endemicity (around 2%), and intravenous drug 
injections, tattooing, and phlebotomy are considered 
major potential risk factors and transmission routes of 
HBV infection in the country (7). Further, socioeconomic 
statuses, life styles, occupations, and cultural attitudes in 
diﬀerent ethnic groups greatly impact the route of HBV 
transmission in Iran (8).
During the last decade, several HBV outbreaks caused 
by nosocomial and iatrogenic transmissions have been 
reported in developed countries (9-16). These ﬁndings 
indicate that several routes of transmission (i.e. multi-784
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dose vials, dental equipment, dialysis units, ﬁnger-stick 
sampling, HBV-infected surgeons, and transplanted or-
gans) exist despite eﬀorts to educate health care workers 
about the risks of HBV transmission (17). Nosocomial out-
breaks occur more frequently in countries with moder-
ate or high prevalence of HBV; however, these problems 
maybe missed or go unreported, because of weak moni-
toring and poor laboratory and surveillance facilities at 
follow-up. Investigation of nosocomial outbreaks is an 
important issue in public health surveillance and should 
be conducted using accurate and sensitive strategies 
(18). Identifying the common source of an HBV outbreak 
is a critical step in the investigation of nosocomial out-
breaks, and accurate and extensive sampling is a prereq-
uisite for such investigations. Good laboratory practices 
and reliable in silico analytical methods are also essen-
tial for successful investigations. Phylogenetic analysis 
of HBV nucleotide sequences can provide evidence for a 
common source in some nosocomial outbreaks (19, 20). 
In other reports on suspected nosocomial outbreaks, 
the investigators showed that the isolated strains were 
genetically unrelated and originated from diﬀerent 
sources of infections (21, 22). Recently, a large nosocomi-
al outbreak of HBV was reported in Belgium. In a retro-
spective cohort study, phylogenetic analysis of the full-
length genomes of 32 isolates led to the identiﬁcation of 
a common HBV source. In this case-control study, it was 
also investigated if the sequencing of partial HBV ge-
nomes (PreS1/S2 [± 520 nucleotides] and PreS1/S2/S [large 
S, ± 1200 nucleotides]) would have enough discrimina-
tory power to accurately identify the common source. 
In both the phylogenetic trees constructed using partial 
genomes, a number of control sequences co-branched 
with the HBV isolated from the patient group. These re-
sults showed that partial sequences could not be used to 
appropriately reconstruct the transmission history and 
produced less accurate results than those produced by 
full-length genome analyses (20). In a previous study, we 
showed that the use of partial genome information for 
sub-genotyping might lead to misclassiﬁcation of HBV 
subgenotypes (23).
In several cases, only partial genome data or a very 
small number of isolates were analyzed to ﬁnd a com-
mon source of infection. In these cases, there is a high 
possibility that the datasets did not contain suﬃcient 
data to guarantee a sensitive analysis (24, 25). Although 
the cost of HBV whole genome sequencing may be a 
prohibitive factor in some settings, full-length HBV ge-
nome analysis is necessary for thorough investigations. 
In the molecular investigation of HBV outbreaks, the 
preferred approach is to compare HBV strains from the 
outbreak with HBV isolates from a control group. This 
control group should be chosen from HBV-infected sub-
jects living in the same geographical region who had no 
previous contact with the presumed source of infection. 
These 2 groups should be phylogenetically analyzed to-
gether with separate full-length reference genomes re-
trieved from the GenBank database. A common source 
of infection is likely when the all the HBV strains of the 
outbreak cluster in a separate exclusive branch with a 
high bootstrap value and when the control and refer-
ence strains are distributed in diﬀerent branches of the 
phylogenetic tree. In addition to phylogenetic analyses, 
other evolutionary tests should also be applied. It is use-
ful to calculate the genetic distances between sequences 
in the HBV outbreak strain collection and in the control 
group. If the outbreak has a common source of infection, 
only a limited number of nucleotide variations will be 
observed among the sequences of the outbreak group 
and a much higher genetic divergence will be observed 
among the control samples. In addition, other evidences 
like a statistical model of distribution for infected cases 
over a period could support arguments for or against the 
existence of a common source. In conclusion, we would 
like to highlight some important steps to investigate an 
HBV outbreak, and either conﬁrm or refute a common 
source of an HBV infection: 
1. The study should be designed as a cohort study.
2. The control cases should be selected from HBV-infect-
ed patients living in the same geographical region who 
had no previous contact with the presumed source of 
infection. 
3. Phylogenetic analysis should be conducted using a 
suﬃciently large number of complete HBV genomes. 
4. The genetic distances between sequences in the con-
trol group and the outbreak group should be calculated. 
5. Additional analyses such as investigation of the dis-
tribution model of HBV-infected cases in the population 
over a period can help corroborate the existence of a 
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